Court has ruled that to obtain immediate review of orders in criminal or civil actions compelling testimony or production of evidence, a subpoenaed witness must be prepared to disobey the order and suffer a contempt citation. 12 The harshness of the choice between compliance and contempt cannot be denied. If the witness suffers contempt to perfect an appeal, he remains a contemnor, subject to imprisonment or fine, unless the appellate court quashes the subpoena. 13 By imposing this difficult choice on the witness contemplating an appeal, however, the rule maintains efficient judicial administration, prevents unnecessary delays, and guards against circumvention of section 1291's finality requirement. IS The Supreme Court's decisions formulating the rule requiring the witness's submission to a contempt citation have failed to indicate whether the citation would be criminal or civil. Contempt proceedings cannot be characterized as strictly criminal or civil within the ordinary meaning of those terms. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 103 (1924) . Courts must classify the contempt citation, however, because the criminal contemnor is protected by constitutional guarantees that are unavailable to the civil contemnor. See Kuhns, The Summary Contempt Power: A Critique and a New Prospective, 88 YALE L.J. 39 (1978) .
The classification usually depends on the purpose of the citation. The purpose of civil contempt is to coerce the witness into complying with the court's order. The penalty, either fine or imprisonment, is terminable upon the contemnor's compliance with the order. In other words, civil contemnors "carry the keys of their prison in their own pockets." In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902) . Criminal contempt, on the other hand, is designed to punish the contemnor who flouts the court's order. See, e.g., Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911) . The penalty is imprisonment for a fixed term, and, unlike civil contemnors, criminal contemnors cannot purge themselves by complying with the court's order. Id. at 442-43.
In practice, nonparty witnesses who suffer contempt to perfect appeals are cited for civil contempt. See, e.g., National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 591 F.2d 174, 180 (2d Cir. 1979) . The court achieves the aim of forcing compliance by threatening civil fines, which continue until the witness complies, the grand jury is dismissed, or the witness prevails on appeal. Criminal contempt is inappropriate for nonparty witnesses because it would eliminate any ongoing incentive for the witness to comply with the subpoena. In Perlman v. United States, 1 6 the Supreme Court created an exception to the rule requiring a contempt citation to perfect an appeal. The facts were unusual. Perlman deposited his papers and models with the clerk of the district court as exhibits in a patent infringement suit brought by his company. Later the district court, on application of the United States Attorney, directed the clerk to produce the exhibits for presentation to a grand jury that was investigating charges that Perlnan had perjured himself in the patent suit. 6 Claiming fourth and fifth amendment privileges in the exhibits, 1 7 Perlman unsuccessfully petitioned to restrain their presentation to the grand jury. 1 8 The government moved to dismiss Perlman's appeal of this ruling, arguing that because the district court's order was part of an ongoing proceeding, it was interlocutory and therefore not appealable. 1"
The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that Perlman's ability to protect his constitutional privileges would be thwarted if he could not appeal the district court's ruling. Because Perlman was powerless to prevent disclosure and to "avoid the mischief of the [production] order," the Court held the order "final" for pur- Sufferance of a contempt conviction is a desperate remedy, but no less desperate is the disease that the remedy was designed to relieve. Litigation cannot go on if those involved are allowed to interrupt it with impunity to take appeals that are usually foredoomed to failure. The issues raised by such appeals have been committed by Congress and the Federal Rules to the discretion of the district courts. For patent abuse of discretion, or to settle "new and important problems" respecting the power of the district court, mandamus is available. is In light of current jurisprudence on fourth amendment standing-requirements, it is doubtful that Perlman would be able to raise his fourth amendment claim today. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
1, 247 U.S. at 13.
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Id. The Court rejected Perman's arguments on the merits, holding that because he had voluntarily produced the exhibits to his advantage as part of his testimony in an earlier patent suit, he suffered no invasion of his fourth and fifth amendment privileges. Id. at 15. In other words, Perlman had no basis for arguing that the district court's subpoena constituted an "unreasonable seizure" or "forced compulsory" self-incriminating testimony.
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H. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS: THE Perlnan EXCEPTmON AS A CONTINUUM
Situations similar to the narrow facts of the Perlman case still arise, as where an attorney moves to quash a grand jury subpoena issued to a court clerk seeking the attorney's retainer agreements on file with the court. 8 6 During the 1970's, however, federal courts dramatically expanded the reach of the Perlman exception on the presumption that intervenors' rights usually would not be protected unless immediate review were granted.
3 7 Courts have broadened the exception to include employers' appeals of their motions to quash grand jury subpoenas that were issued to their employees," clients' appeals of motions to quash grand jury subpoenas issued to their attorneys, 39 and bank depositors' appeals of their motions to quash grand jury subpoenas issued to officials of the bank. Thus the Perlman exception, designed to apply to a "limited class of cases, ' 4 1 has been expanded to cover a variety of situations far different from the "unusual" 42 circumstances in Perlman. Courts of appeals expanding the exception have enunciated no limiting principles to prevent it from swallowing up the rule that contempt is required to perfect immediate appeals. 4 They have failed to follow the Supreme Court's direction that in deciding questions of finality, "the danger of denying justice by delay" must be balanced against the "important competing considerations" of "'the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal appeals.'-44 The policy against piecemeal appeals has heightened significance in the grand jury context, for grand juries cannot function properly if they are constantly interrupted by appeals.' 5 Where federal court dockets
In a unique line of cases, the Fifth Circuit has created a governmental privilege variation to the Perlman exception that arguably swallows up the contempt-to-perfect rule. In Cates v. LTV Aerospace Corp., 480 F.2d 620, 622 (5th Cir. 1973), the court extended the exception to allow the Department of the Navy, asserting an executive privilege in the subpoenaed information, to appeal the order to produce the information even though the order was directed at the Department of the Navy itself. In effect, the court allowed the government to appeal without suffering contempt, thus totally circumventing the contempt route of appeal. 1979) . One explanation for this expansion of the Perlman exception is Congress's enactment of the "recalcitrant witness" statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1976), which empowers federal judges summarily to confine grand jury witnesses who refuse "without just cause" to comply with a court's order. Once courts were given this power, witnesses and interested parties would understandably try to avoid this punishment. Conceivably, the Perlman exception was expanded to circumvent this penalty, allowing both the subpoenaed party and the intervenor to avoid confinement and to obtain review of the claim. One factor that cuts against this explanation is that section 1826 was designed to codify the existing civil contempt practice with respect to recalcitrant witnesses in federal grand jury and court proceedings. See H.R. REP 45 See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327-28 (1940) (appellate disruption of grand jury process strongly disfavored because piecemeal disposition would lead to a "leaden-footed" system and would hinder efficient administration of the criminal justice already are overburdened with motions at every stage of litigation,' 6 courts must respect the finality requirement if the system is to function.
Consideration of these factors demonstrates that an intervenor's interlocutory appeal should be allowed only where the relationship between the subpoenaed party and the intervenor is so attenuated that the contempt route is realistically unfeasible.
4
' To determine whether a particular relationship warrants this application of the Perlnan exception, this comment proposes as a framework for analysis the use of a continuum based on the nature of the relationship between the subpoenaed party and the intervenor. At one end of this continuum is Perlman, where the subpoenaed witness has no connection with the intervenor.
4 8 At the other end, in relationships such as master and servant, the intervenor effectively controls the witness. "Effective control" is not a literal concept; rather, it describes a nexus justifying a presumption that the interests of the intervenor are sufficiently related to those of the witness to eliminate the need for the intervenor to invoke the Perlman exception. In many situations of effective control, the intervenor can be expected to exercise sufficient influence over the witness that he will persuade the witness to suffer contempt to perfect an immediate appeal." In other situations, the intervenor colludes with the witness: the witness, who has been given information by the intervenor, refuses to contest the order, thereby laying the groundwork for the intervenor's argument that invocation of the Perlnan exception is necessary5 0 system). 'I In addition to showing that the contempt process cannot be relied upon, the intervenor must also demonstrate that delay in appealing the subpoena would result in injustice. See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964) . The alternatives, though, will usually be unattractive. Courts have not invoked section 1292(b) to certify intervenors' claims of privilege, and in any event that route is discretionary. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. Moreover, although an intervenor can also protect his claim by raising it at trial in a suppression hearing, see infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text, this protection may frequently be too late; "courts cannot always 'unring the bell' once information has been released." Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 460 (1975 Determining effective control is easy at either end of this continuum. At the Perlman pole, the lack of any relationship between the parties eliminates the possibility that the intervenor will influence the witness. Such a disinterested witness presumably will not collude with the intervenor or risk contempt to perfect an appeal to protect the intervenor's claim, and the Perlman exception therefore should apply. At the master-servant pole, the relationship is defined by the intervenor's ability to control the witness. There is no need to apply the exception in this case because the witness presumably will protect the intervenor's claim by suffering contempt.
Relationships falling between the ends of the continuum are more difficult to categorize. As the nature of the relationship moves away from the Perlman pole, the need for adhering to the final decision rule becomes more pronounced because the probability increases that the intervenor effectively controls the subpoenaed party, thus increasing the opportunity for collusive appeals.
Courts can rely on several factors to determine whether intervenors effectively control witnesses in relationships that lie between the continuum's poles. The relationship's origin, continuity, and duration should be considered. The relationship's origin-whether it is based on contract, agency, trust, or other grounds-points toward another factor: the availability of sanctions that the intervenor might use to coerce the witness. A third helpful inquiry concerns the existence of any ethical, legal, or fiduciary duties that might affect the witness's decision to risk contempt. Finally, courts should consider the effect that the witness's self-interest, such as maintaining a respectable business reputation, might have on a decision to protect the intervenor by risking contempt. Although these factors are not exhaustive, they highlight promising areas of inquiry for courts to use in deciding whether a particular relationship warrants application of the Perlman exception.
III. APPLYING THE CONTINUUM
Using the continuum outlined above, this part analyzes case patterns to illustrate how courts can effectively limit the scope of the Perlman exception. Cases at the opposite ends of the continuum will be examined first, and then the more difficult cases in between will be analyzed. 
A. The Perlman Situation
Where there is no recognizable relationship between the subpoenaed party and the intervenor, and the intervenor asserts a claim of privilege in the subpoenaed information, courts properly have applied the Perlman exception. The intervenor cannot effectively control the witness, and the lack of any relationship between the parties eliminates the possibility that the intervenor might influence the witness's behavior. Accordingly, courts have applied the exception where a court clerk, 51. a government agency, 5 " or some other unrelated and disinterested party" s is subpoenaed to disclose the intervenor's privileged information. In each of these situations, the intervenor could not possibly persuade the witness to risk contempt to perfect an appeal. Reminiscent of the circumstances of Perlman itself," these cases present the most compelling scenarios for applying the exception.
B. Employer-Employee Relationships
Courts typically have applied the Perlman exception to employer-employee cases by assuming, without examining the particular circumstances, that the employee could not be expected to risk contempt to protect his employer's interests. 5 ' Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that this relationship lies closer to the master-servant end of the continuum, where the exception should never be applied, than to the Perlman end. Thus a court should carefully examine each relationship to determine if the employer effectively controls the employee's decision to risk contempt or is in a position to collude with the employee.
Several factors should be considered. 
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The University of Chicago Law Review [49:798 confidence between the employer and employee inhere in many jobs. In United States v. Doe, 5 6 for example, the First Circuit allowed a United States Senator to appeal the denial of his motion to quash a grand jury subpoena issued to his legislative aide. Such a relationship is based on mutual trust and confidence, however, and it seems plausible that one of the aide's duties would be to preserve the Senator's privileged communications, even where faced with contempt. In addition, the aide has an incentive to obey the Senator's orders if he wants to be known as a competent and trustworthy legislative assistant. These factors demonstrate the inappropriateness of applying the Perlman exception where the employee can be expected to risk contempt for the employer's benefit. 5 7 In addition, one could imagine a case in which an employer might order the employee to refuse to suffer contempt, thereby creating a situation in which the employer-intervenor could invoke the Perlman 'exception. In such a case, the employer seeks to orchestrate events to his advantage by pretending that the subpoenaed employee acts independently of his concerns. The Perlman exception should not be applicable in such sham proceedings to avoid the final decision rule by artificially creating an appealable " 455 F.2d 753 (lst Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub noma. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). Senator Gravel of Alaska was Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Grounds. After mysteriously acquiring the "Pentagon Papers," he read excerpts before his subcommittee and introduced the documents as an exhibit. A federal grand jury was convened to investigate Gravel's acquisition of these documents, and subpoenaed his legislative aide and a publisher. The Senator intervened and argued that his privilege under the speech and debate clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, required that the subpoena be quashed. 455 F.2d at 756.
67 The Government attempted in Doe to take the case outside of the Perlman exception by arguing that Senator Gravel would not suffer irreparable harm if the grand jury heard the testimony and that no injury to him was cognizable unless and until he was indicted. The court disagreed, interpreting Perlman as requiring a court to assume the Senator's claim of irreparable injury to be correct. 455 F.2d at 757. The Doe court has been the only court to address this point.
This response avoids the critical inquiry involved in the Perlman exception cases. The issue is not whether to presume irreparable injury, but rather whether the subpoenaed party may be presumed capable under the circumstances of preserving the intervenor's appeal. Given the Doe court's presumption of irreparable injury, every court would be bound to apply Perlman as long as the intervenor presented a prima facie showing of such injury. To preserve the narrow scope of the Perlman exception, courts should focus on the relationship between the parties rather than on the type of injury alleged. But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 804 (3d Cir. 1979) , where the court refused to apply the Perlman exception to allow a corporation to appeal an order denying its motion to terminate grand jury proceedings and to quash subpoenas issued to its employees. The court reasoned that the exception was not applicable because the government, not the subpoenaed employees, possessed the documents sought by the grand jury. Id. at 805.
order, when the contempt route would be available."' Moreover, most employer-employee relationships involve some degree of employer influence and control. 9 The typical employer, like a master, influences the employee with threats of sanctions, and the employee, wary of the possibility of being fired, is reluctant to disregard the employer's orders. The employer also can be expected to offer incentives to ensure employee support. For example, although an employee might be reluctant to carry the financial burden of suffering contempt for his employer's sake, an employer who wants to guard information presumably will underwrite his employee's litigation expenses and possible contempt citation. It is in the employer's own self-interest to encourage his employees to act as his shields. An employer who refuses to support his employees should not be permitted thereby to bootstrap his way into intervention and third-party interlocutory appeal under the Perlman exception.
" Judge Friendly, in National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 591 F.2d 174, 179 n.7 (2d Cir. 1979), recognized that the Perlman exception should not apply where the employer orders the employee not to testify and the employee dutifully complies. Where the employee complies with such an order, it is plausible that the employee would also comply with other orders issued by the employer. Thus the employee might risk contempt to protect the employer, or might obey the employer's order not to suffer contempt in order to perfect a sham Perlnan appeal.
s The District of Columbia and Second Circuits have focused on this control element in refusing to extend the Perlman exception to employer-employee relationships. In In re Sealed Case, 655 F.2d 1298, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1981), Judge Ginsburg concluded that because an employer exercises significant control over an employee, the Perlman exception "flags when an employer moves to quash a subpoena addressed to such an employee." Judge Friendly, speaking for the Second Circuit, has argued that there is no parallel between the circumstances in Perlman and the employer-employee situation: it was "unimaginable" that the court clerk would risk contempt to assist Perlman, but employees are susceptible to employer control and often participate in the relationship out of which the alleged privilege emerges. See National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 591 F.2d 174, 179 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1979) (refusing to extend the Perlman exception to allow the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to appeal an order compelling employee's testimony before a grand jury; counsel for CFTC had advised the employee not to testify, claiming that the testimony was protected by governmental privilege). See also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 318 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1962) (Friendly, J.) (refusing to allow corporation to appeal court's denial of its motion to limit subpoenas issued to corporate officials), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 802 (1963).
In National Super Spuds, Judge Friendly suggested that where a court finds that the employer has directed its employee-witness to flout a court's order, sanctions should be imposed directly on the employer rather than on the obedient employee. He argued that such direct sanctions "might have the salutary effect of curtailing attempts to appeal from decisions denying insubstantial or unimportant claims of ... privilege." 591 F.2d at 108 n.9.
C. Attorney-Client Relationships
Courts disagree over the applicability of the Perlman exception when an attorney is subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, and his client, asserting an attorney-client privilege, seeks to appeal the denial of a motion to quash the subpoena. Although most circuits addressing the issue have expanded the Perlman exception to cover this situation, 0 a well-reasoned minority argues convincingly to the contrary. 6 " Courts applying the exception to the attorney-client relationship presume that an attorney cannot be expected to suffer contempt for his client's sake. 62 The Fifth Circuit, for example, has asserted that an attorney's willingness to protect his client's privilege in the face of a contempt citation varies greatly and depends on the value of the client's business and the particular relationship. The court has expressed "reluctan[ce] to pin the appealability of a district court order upon such precarious considerations." 6 s
The particular nature of the attorney-client relationship renders this assumption suspect. Like journalists, 6 4 many attorneys have accepted contempt citations to protect their clients' confidences. 6 5 As Judge Wyzanski has noted, an attorney, "in his client's interest and as proof of his own stout-heartedness," will often be willing to defy a court's order and risk a contempt citation to render the client's claim appealable. 6 Moreover, the attorney who wishes to maintain a professional reputation for providing compe- tent legal services can be expected to guard his clients' interests; prospective clients will not flock to an attorney who is known to surrender confidential information without a fight. 6 In addition to his own integrity and economic interest, an attorney might have a fiduciary duty to his client to risk contempt if he believes the client's claim is worthy. 8 For example, in In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 6 the Second Circuit permitted the client to appeal because the attorney could not be expected to risk contempt, 70 even though the local bar association had concluded that, under New York's ethics rules, the attorney owed a duty to his client to disobey the subpoena. 7 ' 1 The bar association assumed that an ethical attorney would suffer the contempt citation, and there was no reason for the court to presume that the attorney would act unethically. Because of the bar association's ruling, failure to suffer contempt would make the attorney liable in a malpractice action for breach of duty. 2 The court's application of the Perlman exception fails its own test because there was no reason for the court to doubt that the attorney would follow his client's wishes, especially if he knew that the Perlman exception were not available to per-4, See In re Sealed Case, 655 F.2d 1298, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (because lawyer shared the client's interests in withholding the information and had a "special stake in resisting production," Perlman exception should not be applied).
It is unclear whether an attorney would be liable in a malpractice action for complying with a subpoena against his client's wishes under the threat of contempt. The attorney's compliance with the court's order seems consistent with the Code of Professional Responsibility; Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(2) provides that a lawyer may reveal "[c]onfidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order." One plausible reading of the rule would authorize disclosure only if the court order were valid. Accordingly, the client might have a cause of action against the attorney if the attorney complied with the subpoena despite knowledge that the subpoena impermissibly violated the attorney-client privilege.
The uncertainty surrounding this issue results largely from the fact that clients rarely sue their attorneys for unauthorized disclosure of privileged information. harm exception, however, is also unpersuasive. As Judge Ginsburg has noted, denying an appeal under Perlman "will not 'render impossible' appellate review of [the client's] claims." 7 ' 9 If the attorney's disclosure leads to an indictment, the client can object at trial to the introduction of evidence based on the attorney's grand jury testimony if the attorney-client privilege is found to be valid. 80 In addition, it is not certain that an attorney's forced disclosure before a grand jury dissipates the privilege. Waiver, like the privilege itself, belongs solely to the client and not to the attorney.$ 1 Presumably the client cannot be held to have waived the privilege where the attorney complied with the court's order without the client's consent. 8 "
The disagreement among the circuits over the Perlman exception's applicability to the attorney-client relationship highlights the consequences of extending the exception indiscriminately without scrutinizing the relationship to find whether the intervenor can control the witness's decision to risk contempt. Courts have approached the issue from two distinct premises. Those courts that have extended the exception to include the attorney-client relationship assume the exception's validity and merely determine attorney-client privilege if clients are not permitted immediate appeals, on the ground that clients will be less likely to confide in their lawyers knowing that they cannot prevent disclosures to the grand jury. See In re Berkley & Co., 629 F.2d 548, 552 (8th Cir. 1980). This concern, however, erroneously assumes that the client is powerless to challenge such disclosures in later proceedings. . 1980) , where the court rejected extension of the Perlman exception to the attorney-client situation because the issues likely to be raised were easily within the competence of a district judge: his ruling was "so likely to be fully satisfactory that in the usual case there is no public policy favoring any form of review." Even the Fifth Circuit, an ardent supporter of a broad application of Perlman, has noted that issues concerning the attorney-client privilege are "rarely complex and may be disposed of without oral argument in nearly all cases." In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 641 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1981).
whether the subpoenaed party reasonably can be expected to risk contempt to protect the intervenor's claim. Finding such behavior unlikely, they conclude that the Perlman exception must be applied to preserve appellate review of a deserving claim. Courts that have rejected extension of the exception, on the other hand, assume that appellate review of an interlocutory order is a privilege that conflicts with the policies behind section 1291. They are reluctant to grant appeal on the asserted ground that the subpoenaed party cannot be expected to risk contempt, especially when they confront the typical attorney-client relationship, where the client exercises influence and control over the attorney's actions.
One difficulty with many of these latter cases is that they contest the majority's reasoning on specific factual grounds, thus disguising the underlying issue: whether the judicial system can operate properly if all interlocutory orders affecting intervenors' rights are made immediately appealable. There will be cases where the facts show that an attorney will not risk contempt for his client. These cases, however, which may well be the exception rather than the rule, should not automatically legitimize the extension of Perlman.
D. Troublesome Cases
Other cases involving a recognizable relationship between the subpoenaed party and the intervenor present the most troublesome issues in determining the application of the Perlman exception. These cases are difficult to resolve because the nexus between the parties places their relationship somewhere in the middle of the continuum, where it is uncertain whether the intervenor can be presumed to control the witness effectively. In these cases, courts must scrutinize the relationship, looking for such factors as the availability of private sanctions, the nature of the transaction, and the presence of self-interest, to determine whether the case properly belongs closer to the Perlman pole or to the master-servant pole of the continuum.
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Although there are no easy answers, the continuum analysis leads to more principled and rational decisions about whether an intervenor effectively controls a witness, so that the contempt route to review is adequate. For example, courts should examine the voluntariness of the transaction that initially created the relationship. If the intervenor deliberately chose to provide another See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. party with information that might later be subject to subpoena, he should be presumed to be barred from invoking the Perlman exception. Although this test is harsh, it would provide courts with a precise guideline that would minimize the scope of appellate factfinding and would guard against collusive actions to circumvent the final decision rule through manipulation of the Perlman exception. To shift the presumption, the intervenor might emphasize the particular nature of the transaction, the lack of a continuing relationship, or the accidental or innocent circumstances surrounding the transaction.
Many courts in such situations have uniformly applied the Perlman exception, assuming that the subpoenaed party would never risk contempt to perfect the intervenor's appeal.
8 ' In American Meat Processors Association v. United States 5 for example, the Eighth Circuit permitted several members of a trade association to appeal from an order denying their motion to quash a subpoena issued to another member. The subpoena sought documents concerning each member's business activities. 8 It is difficult to understand how the court so easily concluded that the subpoenaed party was sufficiently independent of the intervenors to warrant application of the Perlman exception. Both the subpoenaed party and the intervenors were members of the same association, and all of them were being investigated for organized crime and racketeering activities. Each business had a distinct interest in not disclosing the subpoenaed information, because once that information was released, all members would be potentially indictable. These factors, when considered with the continuing nature of the relationship and the voluntariness of the transfer of information, indicate that the subpoenaed party could be expected to suffer contempt to protect the intervenors' claim.
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" See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Empanelled Oct. 18, 1979, 633 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1980) (intervening lawyer permitted under Perlman exception to appeal an order denying his motion to quash subpoena issued to private investigator whom he had once retained to assist him in defending a client); Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1969) (intervenor, as named party of a trustee account, permitted under Perlman to appeal order denying his motion to quash subpoena issued to official of the bank holding the account).
" 561 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1977) . " Id. at 110 n.2. The intervenors claimed that the subpoena, which ordered the trade association to disclose its membership, violated their first amendment rights. Id. at 111.
S7 In fairness to the court, the subpoenaed party possibly had nothing to fear from the investigation and might have been willing to cooperate with the government to incriminate its fellow members, and thus the court might have been correct in concluding that the subpoenaed party could not be expected to protect the appellants' rights. Yet the subpoenaed party's recalcitrance should not, by itself, confer appealability through Perlnan. The subpoenaed party's unwillingness is only a sign of what underlies its relationship with the inter-
